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Abstract
We investigate the feasibility of quantum seals. A quantum seal is a state provided by
Alice to Bob along with information which Bob can use to make a measurement, “break the
seal,” and read the classical message stored inside. There are two success criteria for a seal: the
probability Bob can successfully read the message without any further information from Alice
must be high, and if Alice asks for the state back from Bob, the probability Alice can tell if Bob
broke the seal without permission must be high. We build on the work of [Chau, PRA 2007],
which gave optimal bounds on these criteria, showing that they are mutually exclusive for high
probability. We weaken the assumptions of this previous work by providing Bob with only
a classical description of a prescribed measurement, rather than classical descriptions of the
possible seal states. We show that this weakening does not affect the bounds but does simplify
the analysis. We also prove upper and lower bounds on an alternative operational metric for
measuring the success criteria.
1 Introduction
With a quantum seal, a sender hopes to communicate classical information using a quantum state
and also verify whether that information has been extracted. This functionality is called a “seal” in
analogy with the impressions made in wax or clay that have been used to ensure the integrity of
letters and packages for thousands of years [1]. Alice wishes to give Bob a message that is only to
be opened and read by Bob at a later date when an agreed upon set of conditions has been met. For
example, the conditions might be “Do not open the message until the third night of Hannukah,” or
“Only open the message if instructed to do so by Alice.” To this end, Alice gives Bob a quantum state
and a classical description of a quantum measurement. If Bob makes the measurement described
by Alice, with high probability he will extract the classical value of the message. Bob should be able
to make this measurement without further information from Alice. However, at any time before
the agreed upon conditions have been met, Alice can request the state back, and she would like to
detect with high probability whether Bob has cheated and read the message, thereby “breaking the
seal” prematurely. A seal therefore has two success criteria: 1) the probability Bob can successfully
read the message if he follows Alice’s instructions must be high, and 2) the probability Alice can
tell if Bob broke the seal without permission must be high.
Quantum seals were introduced by Bechmann-Pasquinucci [2], giving rise to a vibrant dis-
cussion into their feasibility under different considerations [3–11]. The upshot is that without
limitations on Bob’s possible measurements, if Alice wants Bob to be able to learn her complete
classical message with high probability, then she will not be able to detect his breaking of the seal
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with high probability1. However, this does not necessarily mean that quantum seals are entirely
useless; for example, to send a very long message Alice can design a quantum seal that gives her a
very high probability to catch Bob cheating, while also giving Bob a low but still finite probability of
extracting the correct message that is much higher than his vanishingly small chance of randomly
guessing it [8].
Quantum seals are related to other quantum cryptographic protocols with no-go results such as
quantum bit commitment [12–14] and quantum one-time memories [15]. In bit commitment, Alice
first provides a quantum state, which is her commitment to a bit, and then she might later be asked
to reveal her bit. Note this is in contrast to quantum seal protocols, in that once Alice has provided
the seal to Bob, she is never asked to provide further information. It has been shown that quantum
bit commitment can be built from quantum seals, and so is a strictly weaker primitive [16].
On the other hand, a straightforward argument shows that a one-time memory (OTM) can be
used to create a nearly perfect seal. An OTM is a device that contains two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}n.
Once one message is read, the other is destroyed. To create a seal from an OTM, Alice would set s
to be the message and t to be a random string. Bob could therefore learn s perfectly without further
input from Alice. However, once he reads s, he destroys t. To test if Bob had read the message,
Alice could ask for the OTM back, try to learn t, and if it was inaccessible or not the string she
stored, she would know Bob had cheated. Bob could try to make a new OTM to give back to Alice
as a fake, but he would not know what string to store as t, so his guess would be inaccurate with
high probability. Since seals are weaker than OTMs, a no-go for quantum seals does not necessarily
follow from the no-go for quantum OTMs. However, we note that under certain physically realistic
assumptions (such as no entangling operations), quantum OTMs can exist [17], which implies the
existence of quantum seals under similar restricted scenarios.
In prior work, Chau [8] proved optimal bounds on the success criteria of quantum seals in
the case that Bob has knowledge of the different quantum states that he might receive from Alice.
In this work, we weaken Bob’s advantage by not giving him a description of the seal states, and
instead giving him only a classical description of a quantum measurement and instructions for
how to associate the possible outcomes with classical messages. Alice promises Bob that if he
uses the specified measurement on the seal state, he will obtain the correct message with some
guaranteed probability. She does not provide Bob with any further information as to how to
implement the quantum measurement; Bob’s choice of implementation affects the probability
that his measurement can be detected by Alice2. Since Bob does not have information about the
underlying states, it is potentially harder for him to design a cheating strategy.
Even with this restriction on Bob’s information, we show that Bob can still read the message
with high probability without detection. In particular, when we consider the case that Alice never
wants to falsely accuse Bob of cheating, which is the same metric used by Chau [8], we achieve the
same bounds. Thus it would seem that restricting Bob’s information in this way does not have a
significant effect, while our analysis is somewhat simplified relative to Chau’s.
We additionally examine an alternative operational metric for Alice’s success in detecting
whether Bob has broken the seal: we look at Alice’s probability of detecting Bob cheating if she
makes the optimal measurement to distinguish between the broken and unbroken seal states. This
measurement may sometimes cause her to falsely accuse Bob of breaking the seal when he hasn’t,
1In past literature, seals where Alice and Bob needed to be able to succeed in their tasks with certainty were called
“perfect” seals while “imperfect” seals allowed for only probabilistic success. When more than a single bit was encoded
the seal was called a “string seal.” Here we do not bother with these distinctions, as our results are general and apply to
all of these cases.
2Our setup is therefore similar to that in [4], but with the possibility of sealing a message that is longer than a single
bit.
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but gives her a higher probability of detecting Bob’s measurement when he has broken the seal3.
Under this metric we show that Alice’s chances of detecting Bob, though improved, are still not
good.
In order to obtain some of our results, in Sec. 2.3 we prove a variation on the Gentle Measurement
Lemma [18–20] which may be of independent interest. The Gentle Measurement Lemma states that
if a measurement outcome occurs with high probability, and if that outcome is measured, then the
state after the measurement is difficult to distinguish from the original state. We extend the Gentle
Measurement Lemma to show that the state after measurement is difficult to distinguish from the
original state with high probability even if the outcome of the measurement is not known.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and QuantumMeasurement
We use H to denote a Hilbert space, and D(H) to denote the set of positive linear operators acting
on H with trace one; D(H) is the set of density matrices on H. For N ∈N, we let [N] = {1, . . . , N}.
IA denotes the identity operator on HA, but we drop the subscript if clear from context.
A quantum measurement is described by a positive operator value measure (POVM). A POVM
is a set of operators {Ei}i∈[N] acting on a Hilbert space H such that ∑Ni=1 Ei = I and Ei  0. Given a
state ρ ∈ D(H), the probability of measuring outcome i is tr(Eiρ).
There are an infinite number of ways to implement a given POVM [21, 22] (see [23] for a nice
description of methods to implement a POVM) and the implementation affects the state the system
is left in after the measurement. Here, we think of the implementation as a two step process. In
the first step, we apply what we call the standard implementation: if ρ is measured and outcome i is
obtained, the state collapses to
√Eiρ
√Ei/ tr(Eiρ). In the second step, a completely positive trace
preserving (CPTP) map is applied to the resultant state, and this map can depend on the outcome i
of the first step.
If ρ is measured using a POVM {Ei}, and if the outcome of the measurement is not known, the
post-measurement system is described by the density matrix ∑i
√Eiρ
√Ei [24].
The trace distance between quantum states ρ, σ ∈ D(H) is 12‖ρ− σ‖1, where ‖A‖1 = tr(
√
A†A).
The trace distance has an important operational meaning: given a state promised to be either ρ or σ
with equal probability, the maximum probability of correctly distinguishing which state one has is
1
2 +
1
4‖ρ− σ‖1.
Finally, let
Z(x) =
(
x 0
0 1− x
)
. (1)
2.2 Set-Up
We assume the message protected by the seal takes a value m ∈ [M] for M ≥ 2. Alice encodes the
message into a pure state |ψm〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB where HA refers to System A, the part of the system
that Alice retains, while HB refers to System B, the part of the system Alice gives to Bob as the
sealed message. (If Alice instead would prefer to encode into a mixed state, we can always purify
3This is in contrast to the metric used by Chau [8], in which Alice makes a measurement that would never result in a
false accusation of cheating against Bob, but which as a result is suboptimal for distinguishing between a broken and
unbroken seal state.
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the state without loss of generality. See e.g. [24].) Thus Alice sends to Bob the state ρm ∈ D(HB),
where ρm is the reduced density matrix of |ψm〉 on HB.
In addition to the state ρm, Alice gives Bob a classical description of a POVM ~E = {Ei,j}i∈[M],j∈[Mi ].
She promises Bob that if he performs the POVM ~E on ρm, he will get an outcome (i, j) such that
i = m with probability at least p. This promise implies
∑
j∈[Mm]
tr
(Em,jρm) ≥ p. (2)
After giving System B to Bob, Alice may ask for it to be returned to her at any point. Bob’s
goal in our scenario is to make a measurement on ρm that allows him to determine m, but when he
returns the system to Alice, she can not detect his measurement. Alice’s goal is to design a state
ρm and a POVM ~E , with the properties described above, such that Bob can not learn m without
significantly altering |ψm〉, so that when Alice asks for System B to be returned, she can reliably
determine whether Bob has cheated.
We use two metrics to judge Alice’s success in detecting Bob’s potential breaking of the seal.
First, suppose Alice has no prior knowledge as to whether Bob has cheated, so her a priori belief
is that she either has her original state or a broken state with equal probability. We call pdist her
maximum success probability in distinguishing whether or not Bob made a measurement that
allowed him to learn the message with probability at least p. Second, suppose Alice would like to
detect if Bob made a measurement that allowed him to learn the message with probability at least
p, but never wants to falsely accuse Bob of cheating if he didn’t actually read the message. We call
pNFP (NFP for “no false positives”) her maximum success probability in this task. This metric was
previously used by Chau to quantify Alice’s ability to detect cheating, but without the “no false
positives” interpretation [7, 8]. If Alice chooses her message state |ψm〉 from some distribution of
states, we take pdist and pNFP to be her success probabilities averaged over her choice of state.
For the quantum seal to behave as desired, we would like to have a protocol in which p is large,
and pdist or pNFP are large, so that Bob can read the message correctly with high probability, but
also Alice can detect if he read it or not. However, we show that if p is large, Bob can implement a
POVM on ρm in such a way that pdist and pNFP will be small.
2.3 A Variation of the Gentle Measurement Lemma
The Gentle Measurement Lemma [18–20] says that if a state has high overlap with a POVM operator
and that outcome is measured, then the post-measurement state will not differ considerably from
the pre-measurement state. While there are several different formulations of the Lemma, the one
that is most relevant to this work is formulated as follows: given a POVM operator Ej on H and a
state ρ ∈ D(H), where tr(Ejρ) ≥ 1− e, then∥∥∥ρ−√Ejρ√Ej∥∥∥
1
≤ 2√e. (3)
Here we consider a variation of this Lemma for the case where an initial state ρ is measured
with a POVM, ~E , where one of the POVM operators Ej has high overlap with ρ, but where the outcome
of the measurement is unknown. This scenario occurs, for example, if Alice knows that Bob has made
a measurement, but he hasn’t told her what the outcome of his measurement is. When the outcome
of a measurement is unknown, the best description of the post-measurement state is given by a
probabilistic combination of all possible outcomes of the measurement. In particular, as discussed
in Section 2.1, if the POVM {Ei} is applied to a state ρ, but the outcome is unknown, the density
matrix of the resultant state is given by ∑i
√Eiρ
√Ei.
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We show that the trace distance between the original state and the post measurement state is
still small, even in the case that the outcome of the measurement is unknown. In particular, we
prove the following:
Lemma 1. Given a state ρ ∈ D(H) and a POVM {Ei} on H such that there is one POVM operator Ej
where tr(Ejρ) ≥ 1− e, then the trace distance between the pre-measurement state and the post-measurement
state when the measurement outcome is unknown is bounded as∥∥∥∥∥ρ−∑i
√
Eiρ
√
Ei
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2√e+ e. (4)
Proof. Using the triangle inequality:∥∥∥∥∥ρ−∑i
√
Eiρ
√
Ei
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∥∥∥ρ−√Ejρ√Ej∥∥∥
1
+∑
i 6=j
∥∥∥√Eiρ√Ei∥∥∥
1
≤ 2√e+∑
i 6=j
∥∥∥√Eiρ√Ei∥∥∥
1
, (5)
where we’ve applied Eq. (3). Because
√Eiρ
√Ei is positive semidefinite, and using properties of the
trace,
∑
i 6=j
∥∥∥√Eiρ√Ei∥∥∥
1
=∑
i 6=j
tr(
√
Eiρ
√
Ei) =∑
i 6=j
tr(Eiρ) = tr
(
∑
i 6=j
Eiρ
)
. (6)
Now since ∑i Ei = I and tr(ρ) = 1,
tr
(
∑
i 6=j
Eiρ
)
= 1− tr (Ejρ) ≤ e. (7)
Combining Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) and plugging into Eq. (5), we have∥∥∥∥∥ρ−∑i
√
Eiρ
√
Ei
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2√e+ e. (8)
3 A Naive Approach that Fails
In this section, we present a straightforward strategy that seems promising4, yet ultimately fails.
Let M = 2, so Alice wants to encode a binary message. Suppose Alice creates a state on 3q
qubits that she plans to send entirely to Bob; that is, she sets HA = 1, and HB = C2
3q
. She chooses
σ, τ ∈ S3q uniformly at random, where Sn is the symmetric group of degree n. Then Alice gives
one of the following states to Bob, depending on whether she wants the message to be “1” or “2”:
|ψ1〉 = Uσ|0〉⊗2q|+〉⊗q,
|ψ2〉 = Uτ|1〉⊗2q|+〉⊗q, (9)
4Indeed, this strategy resembles the initial proposal for a quantum seal by Bechmann-Pasquinucci [2].
5
where Uσ (respectively Uτ) is a unitary that acts on a Hilbert space of 3q qubits, and permutes the
qubit registers according to the permutation σ (resp. τ).
Alice tells Bob to measure each qubit using the POVM {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} (i.e. the standard basis
projective measurement), and if the number of 0 outcomes is at least 3q/2, he should decide m = 1,
and otherwise, he should decide m = 2. If Bob uses the standard implementation of Alice’s POVM,
he will perform a projective measurement, and he will be able to read the message perfectly, since
the the number of 0 outcomes will be at most q when m = 1, and at least 2q when m = 2.
After the standard implementation, Bob is left with a standard basis state, which will be nearly
orthogonal to the original state. Thus if Alice asked for the state back, she would with high
probability be able to detect Bob’s measurement.
Bob could try to disguise his measurement by applying a CPTP map to alter his state after
measurement. Let’s assume, without loss of generality, that m = 1, and also that Bob knows that
Alice originally sent a state of the form Uσ|0〉⊗2q|+〉⊗q for some σ ∈ S3q. (This extra information
can only help Bob.) Bob can replace qubits in registers where he got outcome 1 with states |+〉, to
try to make his state closer to Alice’s original state. However with extremely high probability in
the limit of large q (using e.g. Hoeffding’s inequality [25]), he will measure 0’s in about half of the
registers that originally contained the state |+〉. For large q, Bob has a vanishingly small probability
of correctly guessing where these “false 0” registers are, and if he guesses incorrectly, it will make
his overlap worse. Thus, there is very little Bob can do to recover from the measurement; the seal
has been broken, and Alice will detect his measurement.
So why does this protocol fail? While Alice told Bob that he should measure in the standard
basis, Bob can instead use Alice’s instructions to make a different but related measurement. He
measures using the standard implementation of the POVM {Π1,Π2}whereΠ1 is the projector onto
standard basis states whose strings have more than 3q/2 zeros, and Π2 is the projector onto the
remaining standard basis states. Bob has thereby combined all of the measurement operators that
correspond to a given outcome into a single measurement operator. For any choice of σ, τ ∈ S3q,
Π1|ψ1〉 = |ψ1〉 and Π2|ψ2〉 = |ψ2〉. Thus Bob can deterministically distinguish the value of the
message without disturbing the state and breaking the seal, and Alice will be completely unaware
of his measurement.
In the next section, we show that there is always a way for Bob to cheat in a manner similar to
this, as long as Alice wants Bob to be able to read the message with high probability.
4 No-Go For Quantum Seals
We will show that a good strategy for Bob is to apply the standard implementation of the POVM
{Fi}i∈[M], for
Fi = ∑
j∈[Mi ]
Ei,j, (10)
where Ei,j are the elements of Alice’s recommended POVM. If outcome Fi occurs, Bob decides the
message is i. Averaged over Bob’s outcome, the full state on HA ⊗HB after measurement is (see
Section 2.1)
M
∑
i=1
IA ⊗
√
Fi|ψm〉〈ψm|IA ⊗
√
Fi. (11)
6
0.5 1.00.90.80.70.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y A
lic
e 
ca
n 
di
sti
ng
uis
h 
if B
ob
 c
he
at
ed
Probability p Bob can read message
Figure 1: An upper bound on the probability Alice can correctly distinguish whether Bob has
cheated, pdist, is plotted as a function of the probability p that Bob can successfully read the sealed
message if he follows Alice’s instructions (solid red line, Eq. 12). This bound holds for any message
length (M ≥ 2). A lower bound on the achievable pdist in the case of a single bit message (M = 2),
using the protocol described in Section 5, is also shown (dashed red line, Eq. 20). The shaded
portion represents what may be achievable for M = 2 using a different protocol.
Now if Alice asks for Bob to return his system, and he did not make a measurement, she will
have the state |ψm〉〈ψm|. If he did make the measurement using the POVM in Eq. (10), the state will
be that in Eq. (11).
We first bound pdist. Alice’s goal is to determine which state she possesses. We assume Alice
knows that if Bob made a measurement, he measured using the standard implementation of the
POVM in Eq. (10), as this information can only help her. Then using Lemma 1, we have
pdist ≤12 +
1
4
∥∥∥∥∥|ψm〉〈ψm| − M∑i=1 IA ⊗
√
Fi|ψm〉〈ψm|IA ⊗
√
Fi
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
2
+
1
4
(
2
√
1− p+ 1− p)
)
,
(12)
which we plot in Fig. 1.
Next we bound pNFP. If Bob is honest, when he returns System B to Alice, she will have the
state |ψm〉. Therefore, Alice needs a two-outcome POVM, such that one outcome will never occur if
Bob is honest. The POVM that achieves this is {IAB − |ψm〉〈ψm|, |ψm〉〈ψm|}, where the first outcome
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will only be observed if Bob is dishonest. Thus
pNFP = tr
(
(IAB − |ψm〉〈ψm|)
(
∑
i∈[W]
(
IA ⊗
√
Fi|ψm〉〈ψm|IA ⊗
√
Fi
)))
=1− ∑
i∈[M]
|〈ψm|IA ⊗
√
Fi|ψm〉|2 (13)
Now
〈ψm|IA ⊗
√
Fi|ψm〉 ≥ 〈ψm|IA ⊗Fi|ψm〉 = tr(Fiρm) (14)
because the eigenvalues of Fi are between 0 and 1. Plugging in and using Cauchy-Schwarz, we
have
pNFP ≤ 1− tr(Fmρm)2 −
(∑i∈[M]\m tr(Fiρm))2
M− 1 = 1− tr(Fmρm)
2 − (1− tr(Fmρm))
2
M− 1 . (15)
For values of tr(Fmρm) ≥ 1/M, this expression is decreasing in tr(Fmρm), so since tr(Fmρm) ≥ p,
we have
pNFP ≤ 1− p2 − (1− p)
2
M− 1 . (16)
Bounds on pNFP for several values of M are shown in Fig. 2. This formula is identical to Chau’s
bound [8, Eq. 33]5. Thus unfortunately we find Alice can not boost her success of detecting Bob’s
breaking of the seal by withholding information about the seal states.
By either metric (pdist or pNFP), we see that there is a trade off. If Alice wants Bob to be able to
read the message with probability close to 1, then she will not be able to detect with high probability
whether he has broken the seal.
5 Achievability
In order to lower bound the achievability of the upper bounds of Section 4, it is sufficient to analyze
the case that Alice not only provides a classical description of a POVM (and information about how
to associate outcomes with classical messages), but additionally gives Bob information about the
quantum seal states. Since this additional information can only help Bob, it will allow us to put
lower bounds on pdist and pNFP.
This is precisely the scenario that Chau analyzed, and he showed that his bounds are achievable
[8]. Since our pNFP is the same as his bounds, this implies that our pNFP bound is optimal (see
Fig 2). It is interesting to note that when M  1, for which Bob will have a negligibly small
probability of randomly guessing the correct message, quantum seals still offer some rather non-
trivial capabilities. For example, Alice can create a quantum seal where Bob has a 10% chance of
correctly reading the entire message, but Alice can detect if Bob has cheated with 99% probability
and no false positives.
We next investigate whether Alice can achieve the bounds of Section 4 for the metric pdist for
the case of a single bit message (M = 2). We consider a specific strategy for Alice and determine
5In Chau’s case, he deals with two probabilities, p and pmax, which result from Bob having knowledge of the seal
state. In our case Bob has no knowledge of the seal state, so effectively p = pmax.
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Figure 2: Tight bounds on the probability Alice can know with certainty that Bob has cheated,
pNFP, are plotted as a function of the probability p that Bob can successfully read the message if he
follows Alice’s instructions, for different ranges M of possible message values (Eq. 16). Without
any information Bob can always correctly guess the value of the message with probability 1/M,
and we therefore plot each bound over the range p ≥ 1/M (dashed vertical lines).
the probability with which she can detect Bob’s cheating. This allows us to put a lower bound on
pdist, but the specific strategy we choose might not be optimal.
Consider the case that HA = 1, HB = C2, and M = 2,
|ψ1〉 =√p|0〉+ eiφ
√
1− p|1〉, (17)
|ψ2〉 =
√
1− p|0〉+ eiφ√p|1〉, (18)
for φ that Alice has chosen uniformly at random from [0, 2pi], and ~E = {E1, E2} where
E1 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, E2 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
. (19)
Alice provides all of this information to Bob, as well as telling him the value of p (we assume
p > 1/2). As discussed above, since we are putting a lower bound on pdist, it is acceptable for Alice
to give Bob this extra information about the seal states, since that information can only help him.
Alice’s success probability pdist is always analyzed in the case that Bob makes a measurement
that obtains the correct outcome with probability at least p. But note that the unique optimal POVM
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for distinguishing |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 is the POVM E1 and E2 from Eq. (19) [26], and this measurement
only succeeds with probability p. Thus Bob must use this POVM to achieve the desired success
probability.
Bob wants to minimize pdist on average over Alice’s choice of φ. Using the fact that the trace
norm is equal to the Euclidean norm on the Bloch sphere [24], and using the fact that the position
with the smallest distance on average to any point on a circle is in the center of the circle, we have
that Bob would ideally like to return Z(p) if m = 1, and Z(1− p) if m = 2 (see Eq. (1)). Luckily for
Bob, if he simply returns the the result of his standard implementation of E (either the state |0〉 or
|1〉) to Alice, on average over his measurement outcomes, he will return precisely Z(p) in the case
that m = 1, and Z(1− p) when m = 2. Thus Bob’s optimal strategy for minimizing pdist is to do a
projective measure in the standard basis and return the outcome state if Alice requests it.
We can now bound pdist (assuming Alice knows Bob implements the optimal strategy, since
there is no reason for Bob to use any other strategy):
pdist,(M=2) ≥
1
2
+
1
2
‖Z(p)− |ψ1〉〈ψ1|‖1 =
1
2
+
√
2p(1− p)
4
. (20)
This lower bound is shown in Fig. 1. Note that it exceeds the tight bounds for pNFP for M = 2,
meaning that, unsurprisingly, Alice can better detect cheating if she can tolerate occasionally falsely
accusing Bob. We leave for future investigation whether it is possible to improve upon this lower
bound for pdist, the lower bounds on pdist for longer messages, and the related question of whether
the upper bound of Section 4 is achievable or not.
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